Security Investigation on Remote Access Methods of Virtual Private Network by S. Nyakomitta, Dr. Silvance O. Abeka, Peter
© 2020. Peter S. Nyakomitta & Dr. Silvance O. Abeka. This is a research/review paper, distributed under the terms of the Creative 
Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 Unported License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/), permitting all non 




Volume 20 Issue 1 Version 1.0 Year 2020 
Type: Double Blind Peer Reviewed International Research Journal 
Publisher: Global Journals  
Online ISSN: 2249-4596 & Print ISSN: 0975-5861 
 
Security Investigation on Remote Access Methods of Virtual 
Private Network 
By Peter S. Nyakomitta & Dr. Silvance O. Abeka   
 Jaramogi Oginga Odinga University 
Abstract- Remote access is one of the prevalent business trends in today’s computing pervasive 
business environments. The ease of access to internal private networks over the internet by 
telecommuter devices has given birth too many security threats to the endpoint devices. The 
application client software and data at rest on the endpoint of remote access methods such as: 
Tunneling, Portal, Desktop Applications and Direct Access do not offer protection for the 
communication between the VPN gateway and internal resources. This paper, therefore 
investigate the security pitfalls of remote access for establishing virtual private network methods. 
To address these challenges, a remote access method to secure endpoint communication is 
proposed. The study adopted investigative research design by use of empirical review on the 
security aspect of the current state VPN Remote Access methods. This necessitates the review of 
the research article on the current state and related works which leads to critiques and offer 
proposed solution to remote access endpoint VPN. The scope of this study is limited to secure 
virtual private network endpoint data communication. In this paper, an investigation of these 
access technologies given. 
Keywords: remote access, tunneling, portal, desktop application, direct application, gateway. 
GJCST-E Classification: C.2.m   
 
SecurityInvestigationonRemoteAccessMethodsofVirtualPrivateNetwork                                               
                                                                 
                                                                                                     
 
 
Global Journal of Computer Science and Technology: E
Network, Web & Security
                               
Strictly as per the compliance and regulations of:
Security Investigation on Remote Access 
Methods of Virtual Private Network 
Peter S. Nyakomitta α & Dr. Silvance O. Abeka σ
Abstract- Remote access is one of the prevalent business 
trends in today’s computing pervasive business environments. 
The ease of access to internal private networks over the 
internet by telecommuter devices has given birth too many 
security threats to the endpoint devices. The application client 
software and data at rest on the endpoint of remote access 
methods such as: Tunneling, Portal, Desktop Applications and 
Direct Access do not offer protection for the communication 
between the VPN gateway and internal resources. This paper, 
therefore investigate the security pitfalls of remote access for 
establishing virtual private network methods. To address these 
challenges, a remote access method to secure endpoint 
communication is proposed. The study adopted investigative 
research design by use of empirical review on the security 
aspect of the current state VPN Remote Access methods. This 
necessitates the review of the research article on the current 
state and related works which leads to critiques and offer 
proposed solution to remote access endpoint VPN. The scope 
of this study is limited to secure virtual private network 
endpoint data communication. In this paper, an investigation 
of these access technologies given. 
Keywords: remote access, tunneling, portal, desktop 
application, direct application, gateway. 
Abbreviations: Virtual Private Network (VPN), Layer 2 
Forward (L2F), Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP), 




n enterprise network normally consists of many 
remotely connected sites located far away from 
each other. Traditionally, leased lines connections 
utilizing frame Relay and Asynchronous Transfer Mode 
(ATM) were used to provide connectivity among these 
customer sites. The growth of this network made it 
become a costly solution and a challenge for network 
scalability. Virtual Private Network (VPN) came as an 
alternative which provide flexible solutions, such as 
securing communication between remote 
telecommuters and organization’s servers, regardless of 
where telecommuters are located. Sandeep et al, 
(2016), in their article describe a Virtual Private Network 
(VPN) as the traditional approach for an end-to-to end 
secure connection between two endpoints through use 
of public or shared telecommunication infrastructure, 
maintaining privacy through the use of a tunneling 
protocol and security procedures. The VPN establishes 
tunnels between servers in a site-to-site VPN, clients and 
servers in a client-to-site VPN (Avani and Ankita, 2017).  
The approach opted to investigate the security in remote 
access methods since most large corporations, 
educational institutions, and government agencies uses 
VPN technology to enable telecommuter to securely 










Figure 1: Remote Access VPN Architecture 
It can be conceptualized as creating a tunnel 
from one network to another, with encrypted data 
travelling through the tunnel before being deciphered at 
its destination. Telecommuters can connect to their 
corporate LAN or any other LAN regardless of where the 
telecommuters are located (Rashikala, 2013). They can 
access resources such as email and documents as if 
they were connected to the LAN as normal. 
   
  
All teleworkers authenticate themselves with the 
VPN server, which is protected by a firewall. Once a user 
is connected to the network, an internal firewall 
guarantees that access is available only to the required 
resources (Butts and Shenoi, 2011). When a data 
packet is transmitted from a teleworker, it sends it 
through a VPN gateway, which adds an Authentication 
Header for routing and authentication. The data is then 
encrypted and, finally, enclosed with an Encapsulating 
Security Payload which contains the decryption and 
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The receiving VPN server strips the header 
information, decrypts the data, and routes it to its 
intended destination. A VPN allows the provisioning of a 
virtual “tunnel” connecting the two endpoints. The traffic 
within the VPN tunnel is encrypted so that other users of 
the public internet cannot eavesdrop by intercepting 
communications (Tarek and Yasser, 2011). By 
implementing a VPN, a company can provide access to 
the internal private network to clients around the world at 
any location with access to the public internet. 
Remote access VPN is one of the prevalent 
business trends in today’s ubiquitous computing era 
which deploy use of secure remote access to corporate 
resources by establishing an encrypted tunnel across 
the network. It is a user-to-LAN connection used by a 
company that has employees who need to connect to 
the private network from various remote locations. 
Remote-access VPNs permit secure, encrypted 
connections between a company's private network and 
remote users through a third-party service provider. 
According to Rajamohan, (2014), they allow 
secure access to corporate resources by establishing 
an encrypted tunnel across the Internet. While a firewall 
protects the systems and data on a LAN from 
unauthorized access, it does nothing to protect the 
confidentiality and integrity of traffic traversing the 
Internet on its way to and from the LAN. That’s the role 
of a virtual private network, or VPN.  VPN technology 
provides encryption and tunneling functions for 
networked traffic across the Internet. Data is 
encapsulated in an IP “wrapper” that travels over the 
Internet. When data is sent, it must be wrapped and 
encrypted by a gateway using an encryption algorithm. 
At the other end of the communication link, the 
destination gateway must “unwrap” the data, decrypt it, 
and route it to its destination. 
II. Remote Access vpn Methods 
This section presents the state-of-the-art 
Remote Access VPN Methods for establishing virtual 
private network. The remote access methods are most 
commonly used for teleworkers. This section describe 
four categories based on their high-level architectures 
and the security implications. The categories include: 
tunneling, portals, remote desktop access, and direct 
application access. The sub-section below gives an 
investigation of mote access in VPN, as follows. 
a) Tunneling 
Many remote access methods offer a secure 
communications tunnel through which information can 
be transmitted between networks, including public 
networks such as the Internet. According to Murugiah 
and Karen, (2016), tunneling involves establishing a 
secure communications tunnel between a telework client 
device and a remote access server, often a virtual 
private network (VPN) gateway buy use of cryptography 
to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the 
transmitted information between the client device and 
the VPN gateway. The VPN gateway can take care of 
user authentication, access control and other security 
functions for teleworkers. The tunnel uses cryptographic 
protocols like IPsec, SSL and SSH tunnels to protect the 
confidentiality and integrity of the communications. The 
figure 2.shows the tunneling architecture used to set 











Figure 2: Tunneling Architecture
Once a VPN tunnel has been established 
between a teleworker’s client device and the 
organization’s VPN gateway, the teleworker can access 
many of the organization’s computing resources 
through the tunnel.  To use this application of VPN, 
users must either have the appropriate VPN software on 
their client devices or be on a network that has a VPN 
gateway system on it. The VPN gateway can control 
access to the parts of the network and the types of 
access that the teleworker gets after authentication. For 
example, a VPN might allow a user to only have access 
to one subnet, or to only run particular applications on 
certain servers on the protected network. In this way, 
even though the cryptographic tunnel ends at the VPN 
gateway, the gateway can add additional routing to the 
teleworker's traffic to only allow access to some parts of 
the internal network. 
  
A portal is a server that offers access to one or 
more applications through a single centralized interface 
(Murugiah and Karen, 2016). A teleworker uses a portal 
client on a telework client device to access the portal. 
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server, and it communicates with application server 
software on servers within the organization. The Figure 3 
shows the basic portal solution architecture. The portal 
protects communications between the client devices 
and the portal, and portals can also authenticate users 












Figure 3: Portal Architecture 
In terms of security, portals have most of the 
same characteristics as tunnels: portals protect 
information between client devices and the portal, and 
they can provide authentication and access control. The 
application client software and data at rest resides on 
the portal server which then get transferred to the client 
devices which are then typically stored on the client 
devices much more temporarily than data for a tunneled 
solution is. Having the application client software 
centralized gives an organization more control over how 
the software and data is secured as opposed to more 
distributed remote access solutions.  Portals limit the 
access a teleworker has to particular application clients 
running on the portal solutions. 
c) Desktop Application Access 
A remote desktop access solution gives a 
teleworker the ability to remotely control a particular 
desktop computer at the organization, most often the 
user’s own computer at the organization’s office, from a 
telework client device. The solution allows the user to 
access all of the applications, data, and other resources 
that are normally available from their PC in the office. 















Figure 4: Remote Desktop Access Architecture 
Remote desktop access uses a proprietary 
protocol, Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to enables 
users to interfaces with another computer through a 
graphical interface. It allows users to gain access to the 
desktop of another computer. According to (Karen, Paul 
and Murugiah, 2009), the remote desktop access 
software protects the confidentiality and integrity of the 
remote access communications and also authenticates 
the user to ensure that no one else connects to the 
internal workstation. However, because this involves 
end-to-end encryption of the communications across 
the organization’s perimeter, the contents of the 
communication are hidden from the network security 
controls at the perimeter, such as firewalls and intrusion 
detection systems. A remote desktop access client 
program is installed on each telework client device, and 
it connects directly with the teleworker’s corresponding 
internal workstation on the organization’s internal 
network. 
d) Direct Application Access 
With direct application access, remote access 
can be accomplished without using remote access 
software. A teleworker can access an individual 
application directly, with the application providing its 
own security like communications encryption, user 
authentication. According to Murugiah and Karen 
(2016), one of the most common examples of direct 
application access is Web-based access to email, also 
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and connects to a Web server that provides email 
access. The Web server runs HTTP over SSL (HTTPS) to 
protect the communications and the Webmail 
application on the server authenticates the teleworker 
before granting access to the teleworkers email. The 













Figure 5: Direct Application Access Architecture 
The application client software installed on the 
telework client device initiates a connection with a 
server, which is typically located at the organization’s 
perimeter. The direct application access architecture is 
generally only acceptable if the servers being accessed 
by the teleworkers are located on the organization’s 
network perimeter or in a public-facing cloud, and not 
internal networks. Servers that are directly accessible 
from the Internet should already be well-secured to 
reduce the likelihood of compromise. Many 
organizations choose to provide direct application 
access to only a few lower-risk applications that are 
widely used, such as email, and use tunnel or portal 
methods to provide access to other applications, 
particularly those that would be at too much risk if they 
were directly accessible from the Internet. 
III. Related Work 
In (Ernest et al, (2015) proposed advanced 
technologies to provide tremendous support for network 
administrators by implementing a secure remote system 
administration app that runs on android smartphones to 
aid them administer their servers remotely when they 
(network administrators) are out stationed using their 
smartphones. The android app developed in eclipse 
establishes a secure connection with a remote server 
running a PHP application. The app was developed 
based on the Remote Frame Buffer (RFB) protocol. The 
RFB protocol, a display protocol has some security 
lapses including being vulnerable to Man-In-The-Middle 
(MITM) attack using a few tools and techniques 
(Masthan, Kumar and Prasad, 2013). This paper 
therefore incorporated a self-signed Secure Socket 
Layer (SSL) certificate in the android app to enable 
secure encrypted connections to be established 
between the android app and the remote server to 
ensure end-to-end security against attacks such as 
Man-In-The-Middle (MITM). The secure RFB protocol 
proposed and implemented in the android app was 
compared with other existing software for remote 
system administration such as Remote Desktop (RDP), 
and RFB protocols using ICMP ping command. The 
results show that the average response time of the RDP 
protocol was 436ms, that of the RFB protocol was 
496ms and that of the android app which is based on a 
proposed secure RFB protocol was 474ms. The 
proposed android app which will act as an interface to 
the network server will connect to the server using Virtual 
Private Network (VPN) technology. 
With this system, a system administrator can 
create a user remotely, create, view and modify text files 
remotely, check network status, shutdown a server and 
set user privileges. The system was developed based 
on a proposed secure RFB protocol with self-signed 
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) certificate incorporated into 
this RFB protocol to ensure end to- end encrypted 
connections between the smart device (client) and 
server. Mobile Devices Management (MDM) 
applications are developed to address some of the 
challenges associated with mobile devices (such as 
policy management, software distribution, and inventory 
management) that are not related to BYOD security. 
MDM functionality is similar to that of PC configuration 
life-cycle management (PCCLM) tools; however, mobile-
platform specific requirements are often also included in 
MDM suites (Gartner, 2014). 
On their paper, (Kumari and Khan, 2014) 
proposed a symmetric key and smart card-based 
remote user password authentication scheme that was 
intended to provide anonymity while resisting all known 
attacks. On their part, (Shehzad et al, 2015). An 
enhanced privacy preserving remote user authentication 
scheme with provable security.  Security Comm. 
Networks. 8:3782–3795 proposed a supplemented 
scheme to overcome security weaknesses of the 
scheme proposed in (Kumari and Khan, 2014). The 
authors claim to have analyzed the security of the 
proposed scheme in random oracle model which 
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A study by (Madhusudhan and Hegde, 2017), 
pointed out that two robust remote user authentication 
schemes using smart cards that were claimed to defend 
against ID-theft attacks, reply attacks, undetectable on-
line password guessing attacks, off-line password 
guessing attacks, user impersonation attack, server 
counterfeit attack and man-in-the-middle attack.  In 
(Gartner, 2014), the authors discuss that a smart-card 
based remote user authentication scheme consisting of 
four phases, which include initialization, registration, 
login, and authentication has been proposed. 
A wireless body area network (WBAN) is a 
system that provides automatic health monitoring and 
sends crucial health-related data remotely to the doctors 
with the help of body sensors. The protection of these 
health records is therefore very critical to prevent 
malicious and fraudsters accessing these data and 
impersonating the patients. These networks have an 
authentication system as their backbone because a 
lapse in such technologies could lead to the death of a 
patient. In (Salama, Taha, and Elmahdy, (2015), a 
scheme known as PMAS is proposed for mutual 
authentication between the sink (patients’ personal 
cellular phone) and sensor nodes focused on the 
advanced idea behind the Diffie-Hellman key exchange 
scheme. Here, a trusted third party (TTP) distributes 
keys (public and private) to the medical sensor node 
and sink (mobile / cellular phone). 
Recently, elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) has 
been implemented widely in multi-factor authentication. 
It is basically a public key encryption technique based 
on elliptic curve theory that can be used to create 
smaller keys, which yields faster and more efficient 
algorithms as a result (Chande, et al, 2016). It was 
developed to reduce computational costs while 
providing the same level of security as other similar 
operations such as modular exponentiation and it finds 
applications in authentication protocols involving smart 
cards, RFIDs, wireless networks, digital signatures and 
other authentication techniques. 
IV. Critique of the Current Remote  
Access Technologies 
The four remote access methods discussed 
above were noted to have a number of security 
setbacks that render them ineffective in VPN 
deployments. To start with, Tunneled IP traffic may not 
receive the intended level of inspection or policy 
application by network-based security devices unless 
such devices are specifically tunnel aware. This reduces 
defense in depth and may cause security gaps. This 
security weakness applies to all network-located devices 
and to any end-host-based firewalls whose existing 
hooking mechanisms would not show them the IP 
packet stream after the tunnel client does decapsulation 
or before it does encapsulation. In addition, IP 
addresses inside tunnels are not subject to ingress and 
egress filtering in the network they tunnel over, and 
hence may allow malicious content into internal 
networks. Moreover, if the encapsulated IP packet 
specifies source routing beyond the recipient tunnel 
client, the host may forward the IP packet to the 
specified next hop. This may be unexpected and 
contrary to administrator wishes and may have 
bypassed network-based source routing controls. 
On the part of portals applications, Tomas 
(2014) point out that they are faced with challenges 
regarding authentication including user identification, 
authorization, auditing or logging and session 
management. Desktop application access face screen 
sharing security setback that allow an attacker to 
penetrate an enterprise's defenses. In addition, many 
enterprises permit or fail to regulate the use of third-
party file storage services to facilitate remote access to 
data, and when files end up in cloud-based repositories, 
enterprises lose control. On its part, direct application 
access requires the use of IPv6 exclusively to distribute 
addressing to connecting endpoints. This presents a 
larger management problem when it comes to client 
addressing and identification. 
Due to the setbacks noted in the four access 
methods discussed above, a number of protocols have 
been developed to address some of these challenges. 
Unfortunately, these protocols also introduce 
vulnerabilities that render them insecure. For instance, 
the RFB protocol, a display protocol has some security 
lapses including being vulnerable to Man-In-The-Middle 
(MITM) attack using a few tools and techniques (Ernest 
et al, 2015). Despite the fact that RFB protocol uses 
encrypted passwords and network, any communication 
over the network is vulnerable and can be attacked by a 
Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) by using a few tools and 
techniques. In addition, the applications of VNC which 
are developed based on RFB protocol are generally 
slower, offer fewer features and security options than 
Remote Desktop (RD) which is based on the RDP 
protocol (Masthan, Kumar and Prasad, 2013). Though 
the data sent between the server and client is encrypted, 
the RDP protocol may be prone to Man-In-The-Middle 
attack because there is no verification of the identity of 
the server when setting up the encryption keys for a 
session. 
Although businesses are mainly concerned with 
maintaining security, employees are worried about 
preserving the convenience they need to work from their 
mobile devices, as well as the privacy they expect 
regarding the personal information on the device 
(Morufu et al, 2015). One of the biggest challenges for 
organizations is that corporate data are being delivered 
to devices that are not managed by the IT department. 
This has security implications for data leakage, data 
theft, and regulatory compliance. Thielens, (2013), noted 
that the real BYOD challenge is security and that the real 
security challenge is not actually about the devices, it is 
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about controlling access from the devices to the 
corporate data. Moreover, Vignesh and asha, (2015), 
points out that sensitive data on organization and 
personal data are present in these devices and such 
any attack on these devices can expose these data. 
Many enterprises view most of the MDM 
applications as a solution to the security challenges of 
BYOD. However, MDM does not completely address the 
security challenges of BYOD. MDM does not prevent a 
hacker from attacking an employee’s device or a thief 
from stealing it and accessing sensitive data. Data 
leakage, distributed denial of service (DDoS), and 
malware are the most challenging security threats to 
BYOD (Gartner, 2014). Further, Manmeet, Chen and 
Zakiah, (2017), explain that security threat in the 
paradigm of BYOD creates a great opportunity for 
hackers or attackers to find new attacks or vulnerabilities 
that could possibly exploit the students’ mobile devices 
and gains valuable data from them. 
Gokulakrishnan, Jayanthi, and Thulasi, (2014) 
point out that VPN does not provide strong user 
authentication by default. This means that users can 
enter a simple username and password to gain access 
to an internal private network from home or via other 
insecure networks. On its part, the Point-to-Point 
Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) which is the most widely 
supported VPN protocol among Windows users 
establishes the tunnel, but does not provide encryption 
(Alshalan et al 2016). In their paper, Muhammad et al, 
(2016) discuss that a number of users employ mobile 
VPN clients to either circumvent censorship or to access 
geo-blocked content, and more generally for privacy 
and security purposes. Their experiments reveal that 
several instances of VPN applications that expose users 
to serious privacy and security vulnerabilities, such as 
use of insecure VPN tunneling protocols, as well as IPv6 
and DNS traffic leakage. In addition, a number of mobile 
VPN applications actively perform TLS interception while 
other applications inject JavaScript programs for 
tracking, advertising, and for redirecting e-commerce 
traffic to external partners. 
Another study by Varmarken et al, (2015), 
pointed out that some VPN applications implement 
tunneling protocols without encryption despite 
promising online anonymity and security to their users. 
In addition, it was noted that other VPN applications do 
not tunnel IPv6 and DNS traffic through the tunnel 
interface respectively due to lack of IPv6 support, mis-
configurations or developer-induced errors. Both the 
lack of strong encryption and traffic leakages can ease 
online tracking activities performed by in-path middle-
boxes such as commercial WiFi APs harvesting user’s 
data and by surveillance agencies. 
As Shehzad et al, (2015) points out, a 
symmetric key and smart card-based remote user 
password authentication scheme that was intended to 
provide anonymity while resisting all known attacks is 
still vulnerable to anonymity violation attack as well as 
smart card stolen attack. Chin-Ling et al, 2018) 
demonstrated that schemes that the two robust remote 
user authentication schemes using smart cards are still 
vulnerable to ID-theft attack, off-line password guessing 
attacks, undetectable on-line password guessing 
attacks and user impersonation. This is particularly true 
in situations where the user lost a smart card or the 
malicious legal user. In addition, the smart-card based 
remote user authentication scheme consisting of four 
phases has been shown by Gartner, (2014) to be 
vulnerable to offline password guessing attack under 
their non-tamper resistance assumption of the smart 
cards; and it fails to provide forward secrecy. 
The challenge of the WBAN authentication is 
that TTP distributes all the credentials without applying 
any cryptographic functions or any mathematical 
computations. It dictates that the insider person can 
identify different keys of various users easily. Once 
important credentials are available with any malicious 
internal person, then he/she can distribute confidential 
data to others illegally. 
Swapnoneel and Chanchal, (2017) point out 
that mutual authentication has been introduced in 
remote user verification and access control. However, a 
password can be compromised during transmission if 
an efficient scheme is not followed. To address this 
problem, elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) has been 
implemented widely in multi-factor authentication. 
However, the computational cost of one bilinear pairing 
(an important operation of ECC) is about twice as high 
as that of one modular exponentiation operation at the 
same security level. Therefore, the computationally-
intensive nature of ECC leaves a security loophole in the 
protocols that use it. An attacker can force the server or 
client to repeatedly perform ECC operations in order to 
clog them, resulting in one or all of them wasting 
resources by performing unnecessary computations. 
V. Proposed Solution 
In recent years, mobile devices have replaced 
desktop personal computers as the primary computing 
platform for many users. This trend brings to the 
workplace where nowadays the employees use their 
personal owned mobile devices to access company’s 
data. BYOD causes a lot of cyber-attacks towards the 
users and the organization. The proposed solution for 
BYOD addresses the shortcomings noted in some of the 
remote access technologies such as platform integrity 
that lacks in tunneling, authentication such as user 
identification, authorization, auditing or logging and 
session management that lacks in portals applications, 
regulation of file storage services to facilitate remote 
access to data, a feature that is missing in desktop 
application access, client addressing and identification 
that is lacking in direct application access as shown in 
Figure 6 below. 








































































Figure 6: Problems Addressed By the Proposed Protocol
a) Architecture of the Proposed Protocol 
The conventional remote access technologies 
have been noted to have a number of setbacks related 
to identification, authorization, auditing, session 
management, source routing, secure storage and 
addressing. Figure 7 shows the architectural design of 
the proposed protocol. As this figure shows, the 
proposed protocol will comprise of six attack prevention 
mechanisms namely IP scanning, hashing, MAC and IP 
based identification and addressing, digital certificates, 
one time passwords (OTP) and logging capability. IP 
scanning will be effective against source routing attacks 
where attackers make use of intranet IP addresses so as 
to fool the firewall against inspecting the traffic utilizing 















Figure 7: Proposed Protocol Architecture 
The other salient feature of the proposed 
protocol is its hashing activity for any requested storage 
access to ensure secure storage of this vital 
organizational resource. To prevent masquerading 
attacks using false identification and addressing, the 
proposed protocol will utilize a combination of media 
access control (MAC) and IP address of the client and 
server machines for identification and addressing. 
Session management will be secured using digital 
certificates that will serve to protect the VPN 
communication against session hijacking attacks. On 
the other hand, one time passwords (OTP) will be 
instrumental in curtailing privilege escalation for 
authorized users such that once they accomplish any 
authorized activity, they require another set of 
authorization for the next activity. Covert attacks will be 
prevented by the proposed protocol’s logging feature 
that will facilitate auditing during forensic analysis. 
b) Secure Remote Access Method (SRAM) 
Table 3.2 confirms that to secure VPN 
connections, a layered protection approach is 
necessary. The proposed VPN protection protocol will 
be implemented in all the four layers of the TCP/IP stack. 
Figure 3.2 shows the implementation design of the 
proposed protocol 
Table 3.2: Layered Attacks and their likely target 
TCP Layer Attacks to be Prevented 
Application Layer Fingerprinting, Reconnaissance 
Transport Layer Modifications, replay 
Network Layer Source routing, packet redirection 
Physical Layer Masquerading attacks 
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As this figure illustrates, the proposed Secure 
Remote Access Method (SRAM) will be implemented in 
the region between the VPN end devices and the 
firewall. This is because the packets moving in the 
regions between the two firewalls are protected by SSL 












Figure 8: Proposed Secure VPN Access Method 
As such, most attacks are only possible 
immediately these packets exit the tunnel and are 
passed through firewalls. All the layered protection 
discussed above will therefore implemented in the 
regions between firewalls and VPN endpoints (VPN 
client and VPN server). 
VI. Conclusion and Recommendation 
In this study, an investigation of remote access 
methods for establishing virtual private network a has 
been carried out. From this examination, it has been 
noted that all of them fall short of endpoint security, 
making it possible for attackers to carry out 
unauthorized data transfers from their victim machines 
due to lack of cryptographic protocols for securing the 
data that reside at the client device. 
Towards the end of this paper, a protocol that 
could potentially address the security gap endpoint 
remote access client devices has been provided. One of 
the pillars of this protocol is encryption that would help 
enciphered the content of the data at the endpoint 
device and secondly component of this protocol is the 
dual-factor authentication that will requires the presence 
of two or more factors to prove the authenticity of the 
account holder. Owing to its security entropy, this 
protocol is therefore recommended for implementation 
in remote access methods for establishing virtual private 
network. 
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